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ABSTRACT: The principles of the system of criminal penalties inspire the legal construct of complicity 
in the administrative tax offence. However, the latter has relevant specifities that are particularly 
evident in two cases. First, when the violation ascribable to the taxpayer is also a consequence of 
the contribution of a tax advisor through his expertise. Second, when the tax offence is physically 
committed by an individual but in the interest of another natural or legal person. Furthermore, this 
paper underlines that the tax penalty system should be even more focused on the beneficiary of the 
tax offence rather on than its perpetrator, and in order to gain this aim, it is suggested to modify some 
rules today in force.
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1 COMPLICITy
The Legislative Decree nº 472 of November 18, 1997, governing the 
fundamental enforcement criteria of administrative sanctions for breach of tax 
rules, outlines a system inspired by the principles of the system of criminal 
penalties. This choice would originate from settled case-law and doctrinal 
development regarding tax administrative penalties as punitive sanctions 
for breach of a principle, and not as enforcement sanctions for the breached 
principle, as are civil penalties. So, as a consequence, it is allowed to employ – as 
far as possible – principles already established in criminal law so as to facilitate 
the implementation process1. It is well-known that this system is primarily 
1 For an in-depth look at the general theme of administrative tax penalties, also with respect to legislative 
developments, see DEL FEDERICO, Lorenzo, Le sanzioni amministrative nel diritto tributario, Milano, 1993; 
CORDEIRO GUERRA, Roberto, Illecito tributario e sanzioni amministrative, Milano, 1996; FAVA, Claudia, 
Sanzioni tributarie e persone giuridiche tra modelli penalistici e specificità di settore, Milano, 2006; 
COPPA, Daria and SAMMARTINO, Salvatore, Sanzioni tributarie, in Enc. dir., Milano, 1989, vol. XLI, 438; 
Various Athors, La riforma delle sanzioni amministrative tributarie, edited by G. Tabet, Torino, 2000; Various 
Authors, Commentario alle disposizioni generali sulle sanzioni amministrative in materia tributaria, edited 
by F. Moschetti, L. Tosi, Padova, 2000; BATISTONI FERRARA, Franco, La riforma del sistema sanzionatorio 
non penale in materia tributaria, in Riv. Guard. Fin., 1997, 1429; LUPI, Raffaello, Prime osservazioni sul 
nuovo sistema delle sanzioni amministrative tributarie, in Rass. trib., 1998, 329; MARONGIU, Gianni, La 
nuova disciplina delle sanzioni amministrative tributarie, in Dir. prat. trib., 1998, I, 283; DEL FEDERICO, 
Lorenzo, Disposizioni generali in materia di sanzioni amministrative per le violazioni di norme tributarie, in 
Commento agli interventi di riforma tributaria, edited by M. Miccinesi, Padova, 1999, 1065; VINCIGUERRA, 
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characterized by the principle of personal liability of the primary actor. Article 
9, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree nº 472 of 1997 – provision concerning 
complicity – fits into this scheme, since it is aimed at sanctioning any person 
who, in various capacities, participates in the commission of a tax offence2. The 
intention was, in this way, to emphasize the deterrent and punitive character of 
the financial penalty (and of the supplementary penalty), thus making it more 
effective as compared to a single sanction to which all the parties to the offence 
are jointly and severally liable. The above provision sets forth a mechanism 
of extent of personal liability of the primary actor, apparently similar to the 
one existing in criminal law, pursuant to art. 110 of the Criminal Code, and in 
administrative law, referred to in art. 5 of Law nº 689 of November 24, 19813. 
In order for complicity of all actors to occur in committing the tax offence, 
the above mentioned rule mandates the coexistence of four specific costitutive 
elements, i.e. a) a plurality of subjects; b) the commission of an offence; c) the 
contribution of each actor to the accomplishment of the offence; d) the existence 
of the psychological element in each contributor, i.e. their will to cooperate in 
the unlawful conduct. 
The legal construct of complicity is, however, explicitly excluded in 
art. 9, para. 2, of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, in cases where the infringement 
derives either from an omission involving the obligation of multiple persons, 
such as failure to file an estate income tax return, as is the case for coheirs, or the 
submission of an irregular value declaration by parties to a transaction subject to 
registration tax. The application of the principle quot capita, tot poenae, proper 
to the legal construct of complicity in tax offences is, therefore, confined only to 
cases of intentional or negligent causal complicity of third parties in infringing 
obligations of one person.  
2 ThE SPECIFITy OF ThE SySTEM OF TAX PENALTIES IN ThE AREA OF COMPLICITy
Although on cursory reading it might seem that complicity, referred 
to in art. 9, para.1, of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, follows the regulatory 
framework of the same legal construct codified in criminal law under art. 110 
of the Criminal Code, the identification of the costitutive elements of such legal 
Sergio, Considerazioni sui principi generali di diritto sostanziale delle infrazioni amministrative tributarie, in 
I “Venerdì di Diritto e Pratica Tributaria”, Convegno Genova 14-15 ottobre 2016 – Per un nuovo ordinamento 
tributario, Atti preparatori, 2016, 941 et seq. See also case-law: Constitutional Court, sentences nº 196 of 
June 4, 2010, and nº 104 of April 18, 2014, in the ‘fisconline’ data base.
2 On the same topic, see TOPPAN, Arturo, Art. 9 – Concorso di persone, in Commentario alle disposizioni 
generali sulle sanzioni amministrative in materia tributaria edited by F. Moschetti, L. Tosi, Padova, 2000, 
270; NUCERA, Valeria, Art. 9 – Concorso di persone, in Commentario breve alle leggi tributarie, Volume 
2 – Accertamento e sanzioni, edited by F. Moschetti, Padova, 2011, 745.
3 On this theme, see DEL FEDERICO, Lorenzo, Le sanzioni amministrative nel diritto tributario, cit., 355 et seq.; 
SANDULLI, Maria Alessandra, Le sanzioni amministrative pecuniarie. Principi sostanziali e procedimentali, 
Napoli, 1983, passim.
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construct shows certain peculiarities, proper of tax law, that criminal law does 
not leverage4. 
In the first place, with regard to the element of “plurality of subjects” 
(costitutive element sub a), unlike what occurs in criminal law (where complicity 
can be necessary or possible, whether or not the plurality of subjects performing 
the act is a costitutive element of the illegal conduct5), in tax matters it is not 
possible to identify cases of illegal practices where complicity is necessary. Each 
offence can, in fact, be perpetrated by means of the conduct of one person, the 
taxpayer, who, with no other actors present, is able to infringe any tax provision 
in terms of formal or substantive obligations. For this reason, within the confines 
of tax offences, cases of complicity are only possible since, to this end, it is 
necessary to examine, with particular attention, the tangible contribution made 
by each contributing person. In fact, under tax law, complicity is a legal construct 
which is applicable only in sporadic cases, also owing to the difficulties of 
tax authorities in establishing the wrongdoing of all contributing parties. This 
insomuch as tax authorities are reasonably confined to verifying only the breach 
committed by the beneficiary of the effects produced by the tax offence6. 
Another peculiarity of complicity in tax law, as compared to the parallel 
legal construct in criminal law, can be found in respect of the second costitutive 
element that, as previously remarked, is the commission, in the sense of full 
accomplishment, of the tax offence (costitutive element sub b). Indeed, the tax 
legal system, unlike the criminal one, do not admit the hypothesis of attempt to 
commit an offence and, accordingly, in order for the conduct of an individual 
to be sanctioned, the fact described in the sanction provision must have been 
fully accomplished. 
By contrast, minor differences can be found about complicity between 
tax provisions and the provisions of criminal law, regarding the requirement of 
the necessary contribution made by each contributing actor in accomplishing 
the wrongdoing (constitutive element sub c). In this respect, in order for a case 
to be regarded as complicity, it is necessary to have a causal contribution in the 
commission of the tax offence, meaning that the illegal situation could not occur 
without the contribution – commission or omission – of all contributing parties 
4 Italian tax authorities, analysing the legal framework of administrative tax penalties set forth in Legislative 
Decree nº 472/1997, pointed out that the notions of criminal law, reintroduced by the legislator in the area 
of taxation in Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, must necessarily take into account that some of the principles 
criminal law refers to, assume an almost exclusively theoretical relevance in the area of taxation (see Ministry 
of Finance, Circular Letter of July 10, 1998, nº 180/E, para. 10, in the “fisconline” data base).
5 For example, the crime of theft, referred to in art. 624 of Criminal Code, as a type of offence where complicity 
is possible, and that of brawl, laid down in art. 588 of Criminal Code, that constitues instead a type of offence 
where complicity is necessary.
6 On the same issue, see also DEL FEDERICO, Lorenzo and LUPI, Raffaello, Contro l’evasione un grande concorso 
(nell’illecito), in Dial. trib., 2012, 633; BUCCISANO, Andrea, In tema di responsabilità sanzionatoria del 
contribuente e del suo consulente fiscale, in Riv. dir. trib., 2010, I, 57. 
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(causal relationship). However, in tax matters, a causal relationship does not 
necessarily imply a physical conduct of each actor, but can require, sometimes, 
also a merely psychological involvement, given the peculiarity of a tax offence 
case as a form of conduct that is usually “unisussistente”, i.e. a wrongdoing 
perpetrated by means of one single act or omission. In fact, under tax law, it is 
possible, in the abstract, that the offence is either committed through a fractioned 
performance over time or a sequence of actions or omissions, but this turns out 
to occur quite infrequently, since in tax matters illegal acts “unisussistenti” (i.e. 
single illegal acts) of commission or omission are those which mainly assume 
greater importance. One may consider, for example, infringements in tax 
returns set forth in art. 1 of Legislative Decree nº 471 of December 18, 1997, 
where the taxpayer, though having complied with the preparatory instrumental 
requirements, then specifies – in the tax return – a lower disposable income than 
the real one. 
Even with respect to the last costitutive element of complicity in the com-
mission of tax offence, i.e. the necessary existence of the psychological ele-
ment in each contributing actor (constitutive element sub d), one should draw 
a comparison with the parallel legal construct in criminal law. Indeed, art. 5 of 
Legislative Decree nº 472/1997 specifies that, even in tax law, the participation 
in the accomplishement of an offence, whether a commission or an omission, 
can only be sanctioned if it occurred with intent or by negligence. However, 
whilst the conscious and voluntary involvement of the actor in the commis-
sion of the wrongdoing does not hinder the sanctioning of his conduct7, majors 
problems arise, instead, in respect of the situation of cooperation of negligent 
character. Except that, even with no explicit legal provision in this regard, as is 
the case instead in criminal law pursuant to art. 113 of Criminal Code (under the 
heading “cooperation in negligent offence”), it appears legitimate to provide for 
complicity by negligent behaviour also with regard to tax offences, insomuch as 
the tax lawmaker, under art. 5 of the previously mentioned Legislative Decree 
nº 472/1997, provided that any illegal conduct, even though merely “negli-
gent”, must be sanctioned. However, it should be recalled that, in actual fact, 
complicity arising from negligence turns out to occur quite infrequently, since 
the perpetration of a tax offence, in and of itself, is usually connected to specific 
7 By way of example, reference should be made to the supply of goods that may be subject to VAT. Here, it is 
easy to identify, in the behaviour of the final consumer, the possible wilful cooperation in the commission of 
the offence, i.e. failure to invoice. Indeed, if the transferor, faced with the request made by the consumer to 
receive a proof of purchase (invoice or receipt) certifying the taxable transaction, does not satisfy the request, 
it is clear that no charge can be brought against the final consumer. By contrast, in cases where the consumer 
is willing to waive his entitlement to obtain the proof of purchase in exchange for a discount on the purchase 
price, then this consitutes a liability of the consumer for intentional involvement in the offence perpetrated by 
the VAT taxable person.
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choices of taxpayers. Therefore a negligent conduct is already a rare occurren-
ce: complicity by negligent behaviour is, accordingly, even more so8.
3 COMPLICITy OF TAX ADVISORS
The theme of complicity in the commission of a tax offence is relevant, 
however, with particular reference to the liability of tax advisors for offences 
attributable to taxpayer, and from which the latter might benefit illegally9. It is 
certainly possible, in fact, that the violation ascribable to the taxable person is, 
sometimes, also a consequence of the contribution of a tax practitioner through 
his expertise10. In such cases, in order to identify complicity in the offence, one 
needs to assess, in actual fact, to what extent the tax advisor affected the illegal 
conduct of the taxpayer. In that regard, it is to be noted that the complicity of 
an advisor in the commission of a tax offence by a taxpayer can occur both as 
moral and material complicity. As regards moral complicity, the contribution 
of the practitioner is realized by engaging in a conduct aimed at providing 
the taxpayer with such expert advice, opinions or solutions as to induce the 
taxpayer to commit the offence, being enticed by the possible benefits (in terms 
of tax savings) ensuing from it. Such conduct is relevant for complicity only if 
the tax advisor incites the taxpayer to perpetrate the offence or when, because 
of the advisor’s conduct, the taxpayer is persuaded to perpetrate the offence. 
In material complicity, on the contrary, the tax advisor directly intervenes in 
the accomplishment of the wrongdoing, by making a contribution either in the 
preparatory phase of the infringement or in the subsequent commission phase11. 
8 For example, it could be a case where one or more directors of a company entrust an unqualified person 
the keeping of the accounting records with the aim to reducing costs. In that case, in fact, the director 
creates a clear situation where the verification of irregularities are likely to arise, irregularities that can lead, 
consequently, to violations of tax rules (i.e., a false tax return).
9 In respect of the previous system of penalties provided before the introduction of Legislative Decree 
nº 472/1997, DEL FEDERICO, Lorenzo, Le sanzioni amministrative nel diritto tributario, cit., 353-358, in 
dealing with the issue of liability of tax advisors from the standpoint of tax penalties, had properly pointed 
out that tax offences occur in the form of the so-called “illecito proprio” or “proper” offence, and not in 
the form of the so-called “illecito comune” or “common” offence, and, accordingly, the tax violation can 
only be committed by subjects that are specifically identified by the law. This raised considerable doubts 
as to the involvment of tax advisors in the administrative penalty liability, in view of the fact that it turned 
out to be extremely difficult to identify the specific legal basis of shared liability of tax advisors. However, 
it was concluded that the enforceability of the complicity offence in such cases, pursuant to art. 5 of Law 
nº 689/1981, had to be excluded. The administrative penalty liability of the tax practitioner was actually 
declared thanks to the analogic interpretation of the provisions of art. 11 of the same Law nº 689/1981, 
which governs in fact the shared liability to incur penalties if the tax offence is committed by multiple people, 
considering that the principle of jointly and several responsibility of the actors of the infringement is generally 
applicable in the area of tax penalties. 
10 On a similar issue, in particular with regard to the liability of subjects performing audit activities, see FICARI, 
Valerio, Certificazione del bilancio IAS, rilevanza probatoria, responsabilità del revisore contabile e sanzioni 
amministrative, in Rass. trib., 2010, 1090.
11 Consider, for example, the case in which the tax advisor, keeping the accounting records of the taxpayer, omits 
to record and account for, even unintentionally, some sales invoices of the taxpayer. This act would be relevant 
both for the commission of the breach, in the area of the recording of tax documents, and for the preparation 
for the infringement, i.e. the false tax return. 
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In both cases, in fact, the joint participation of the estraneus constitutes an 
essential element for the actual commission of the offence by the intraneus, 
i.e. the taxpayer. However, these criteria must be related – in cases where 
the professional service required of the tax advisor is especially complex – to 
the provisions of art. 5, para. 1, of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, that, in 
accordance with the principle of fault, which set forth that the tax advisor incurs 
liability as accomplice of the taxpayer only if he acted deliberately (as is the case 
where the tax advisor is conscious of its irregularity in the keeping of accounting 
records) or by severe negligence (when, for example, a tax advisor makes a 
macroscopic error in a particularly complex bookkeeping). By contrast, there 
is no question of the liability of tax advisors in cases of mere connivance, since 
the tax regulations do not prescribe a general duty to impede someone else’s 
illegal conduct12.
Once established the above principles, then one needs to verify, without 
any pretence of being exhaustive, what are the cases in which moral and 
material complicity can be identified in the administrative tax offence.
With regard to moral complicity, it must be noted that there are different 
ways in which tax practictioners can affect the psychological sphere of their 
clients so as to induce them to commit the tax offence. The most common case 
is certainly that of the request from the client for an opinion or advice to reduce 
the tax burden. Here, the taxable person is reasonably already prone to commit 
the tax breach considering that, in fact, he specifically turns to the advisor to this 
very end and, accordingly, it is not the practitioner who instils, in the client, the 
idea of escaping taxation.
The liability of the tax practitioner, from the tax penalty standpoint, 
can only be identified, therefore, if such professional – by providing advisory 
services – suggested the modus operandi and made it possible, in practice, 
for the taxable person to achieve the illegal goal he was pursuing. Moral 
complicity is accomplished also in cases where the advisor showed the taxable 
person a form of fiscally incorrect conduct that is already well-known and 
widespread, and that the client might already know, independently of the 
professional advice. In fact, even though the client was already aware of the 
tax evasion method, the tax practitioner, by means of the advice provided, has 
unquestionably driven the taxpayer to pursue the evasion goal13. Likewise, if it 
12 In this regard, see also LA GROTTA, Fabiola, Il concorso di persone nei reati tributari, in Dir. prat. trib., 2005, 
II, 891; FAVA, Claudia, Il concorso di persone, in Various Authors, La riforma delle sanzioni amministrative 
tributarie, cit., 128.
13 For this case, instead, even though in respect of infringements of criminal character, CARDONE, Vincenzo, 
Sul concorso del consulente fiscale nei reati tributari commessi dal contribuente, in Riv. dir. trib., III, 
2008, 8, excludes any shared liability of tax practitioners since the latter, pointing out to the client a form of 
illegal behaviour that is so well-known and widespread, would not, at the very least, affect the psyche of the 
requesting client.
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was the client who “devised” a method in order not to correctly contribute to 
public spending, and the practitioner simply provided his advice supporting 
whatever was “devised” by the taxable person, it must be considered that the 
advisor acted in moral complicity considering that, through his conduct, he 
approved and reinforced the client’s intent to evade. At any rate, it is difficult 
to refer to exclusively general judgement criteria about this subject, since it is 
necessary to assess, on a case-by-case basis, besides the type of advice provided 
to the client, also the actual effect of such advice on the commission of the 
administrative offence. In fact, it does not appear plausible to identify a case of 
advisor’s moral complicity if the taxpayer was firmly convinced to evade taxes 
and – in actual fact – the practitioner’s advice has not reinforced that intent. 
Moreover, the conduct of an advisor who, upon request of the client, enlightens 
him on prospective risks and benefits of actions or omissions aimed at obtaining 
a tax advantage, neither encouraging, nor at the same time discouraging the 
taxable person from perpetrating the tax offence, should be regarded as mere 
connivance and, therefore, not punishable14. Such expert action, in fact, appears 
to be part of the ordinary professional activity of impartially advising clients 
about the consequences of their conduct, and then letting them decide whether 
to adopt it.
In cases where it is the tax advisor who directly submits to the client 
the strategy for tax evasion, with no specific request, moral complicity appears 
certainly occurs, obviously when the taxpayer then implements the advice of the 
expert. Here, in fact, the drive for engaging in illegal conduct directly originates 
from the tax advisor, who is certainly morally involved in the infringement of tax 
law by the taxpayer. The same remarks apply in those cases where the expert 
merely suggests to engage in conduct aimed at committing an abuse of tax law, 
rather than actual tax evasion. In fact, considering that the abuse of law in tax 
matters is sanctioned pursuant to art. 10a, para. 13, of Law nº 212 of July 27, 
2000, if the tax advisor devises for his client a transaction that is considered 
abusive, it appears difficult to uphold his non-involvement in the responsibility 
for the offence.
It is worth pointing out here that there is a more delicate issue in terms 
of liability of the advisor, from the tax penalty standpoint, in cases where he is 
requested to give what is generally called an independent pro-veritate opinion on 
the abusive character of an arrangement put forward by, and upon the exclusive 
initiative of, the client. In this case, moral complicity can indeed be identified 
only in those cases where the client presents to the tax advisor an arrangement 
or a series of arrangements which appear to be manifestly an abusive scheme 
and, notwithstanding that, the advisor issues an opinion of approval. The 
14 Cordeiro Guerra Roberto, Concorso di persone ed autore mediato nella nuova disciplina delle sanzioni 
amministrative tributarie, in Rass. trib., 2000, 400-401.
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scope of the tax law abuse, being outside the perimeter of the violation set 
out in tax regulations, is, in and of itself, uncertain and refers to requirements 
which are not always clearly defined and objective. As a consequence, as 
we mentioned earlier, except for the cases that are manifest, the tax advisor 
could have supported, in good faith, the arrangement put forth by the client, 
but then, contrary to the opinion of the expert, this is qualified as abusive by 
tax authorities. In such cases, therefore, provided that the advisor accurately 
interprets the case submitted to his examination, moral complicity is excluded, 
because the advisor was unaware of issuing an opinion aimed at validating an 
abusive conduct. In this regard, reference must be made to the above provisions 
of art. 5 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, which limits the possibility to punish 
for infringements committed (as accomplice, in this case) in providing tax advice 
in cases where it is necessary to solve especially difficult problems. Assessing 
whether an arrangement can be regarded as abusive, indeed, is usually a 
complex and difficult professional task; therefore, the conduct of the advisor can 
be associated to that of the taxpayer, from the stanpoint of sanctions, only if the 
expert acted deliberately or by gross negligence. In actual fact, liability from the 
penalty standpoint can be extended to a tax practitioner by tax authorities only 
if he issued an independent pro-veritate opinion validating an arrangement that, 
pursuant to the provisions of art. 10a of Law nº 212/2000, was clearly aimed 
at circumventing tax law or if he supported the client’s initiative, reinforcing 
his intent to proceed, in a superficial manner, without performing the required 
analysis that falls within the duty of the expert.
As for material complicity, it is worth recalling that one of the most 
contentious issues among the scholars and in jurisprudence, in terms of the 
possibility of establishing a liability of the tax advisor to incur penalties, concerns 
the (eventual) obligation to perform also a substantive analysis of the lawfulness 
of the documents delivered to him for bookkeeping as well as for the tax or VAT 
returns. Likewise, this calls into question whether the tax advisor issuing what is 
generally called a light-weight visa, i.e. the visa proving compliance, or a heavy 
visa, i.e. tax certification, with a view to avoiding that the punishable conduct 
be identified, is actually obliged to verify the truthfulness of the documented 
transactions or his professional obligation is confined to controlling that the 
transactions documented match the bookkeeping and comply with the legislation 
on corporate income tax. The issue is, therefore, the necessary nature of the 
verification by the tax advisor, first, of the existence of the transactions, relevant 
for VAT purposes, certified by the documents and, then, of their inherence to the 
taxpayer’s business. In these cases, in fact, material complicity of the advisor in 
the tax offence can be identified, since he performs actions, such as transposing 
the bookkeeping data in the tax return or issuing the visa proving compliance, 
which allow the taxpayer to evade taxes. In this type of case – where the advisor’s 
specific conduct assumes relevance for the commission of the tax offence (for 
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instance, in drawing up accounting records and filling in the tax return) and if he 
didn’t engage in such conduct, the offence would not occur – one can identify 
an actual obligation of the advisor to establish the lawfulness of the transactions 
that are relevant for tax purposes and documented by the taxpayer. In fact, if 
the tax practitioner became aware that such operations are not in line with tax 
rules, he should refuse to perform the professional activity aimed at perpetrating 
the tax offence15. The tax advisor, in actual fact, cannot feel obliged to perform 
his professional work, if this is (also) aimed at accomplishing a breach of the 
law. Rather, the advisor’s refusal to carry out his professional work should deter 
the taxable person from proceeding to commit the offence. Here, in fact, the tax 
advisor would make a substantial causal contribution to the occurrence of the 
illegitimate conduct. It ensues that this case is beyond mere connivance where 
the advisor, having become aware, while performing his work, of the potential 
tax offence that the taxpayer is about to accomplish, does not prevent it. In the 
latter case one cannot identify any form of complicity, since the tax advisor does 
not provide any support, whereas in the above mentioned case the professional 
work assumes relevance for the perpetration of the offence.
Subject to these positions of principle, it is indeed worth pointing out that 
advisors, in performing their job, are not required to carry out an audit of the 
documents delivered to them, like the one which is incumbent on tax authorities. 
They are not tasked with accurately verifying the lawfulness of the activities of 
their clients, but must be confined, with a view to excluding their liability for tax 
penalties, not to cooperate in cases where the potentially illegitimate conduct is 
manifest16, or they must request clarifications from their clients for those cases in 
which the violation or the circumvention of the regulation is not so apparent, but 
could be reasonably upheld. Once they receive such clarifications, according 
to the requirements of due diligence, they will have to carefully assess them, 
so as to figure out if the conduct might lead to infringe tax regulations and, 
accordingly, decide whether to perform the task they are entrusted with. With 
the exception of the cases of manifest illegality, of course, advisors in carrying 
out the necessary checks must not engage in conduct that may affect the 
taxpayer’s proper compliance with tax obligations. It is well known, in fact, that 
it is necessary to fulfill tax obligations by strict deadlines.
Thus, the advisor, in taking up his appointment, must demand from his 
client to receive all documents required to perform his duties sufficiently in 
advance with respect to the deadline of tax compliance in order for both the 
practitioner to have time to review it and for the client, in case the advisor refuses 
15 See also SCHIAVOLIN, Roberto, La responsabilità penale del professionista, in Rass. trib., 2015, 540, who, 
even though in the area of criminal offences, reckons that the tax advisor should refrain from performing his 
assignment. As regards tax administrative sanctions, in the same sense, see Court of Cassation, Section Civil 
III, sentence nº 9916, April 26, 2010, in the “Pluris” database.
16 For example, in the tax return, an allowance of a cost that is manifestly not inherent to the business activity.
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to perform his professional assignment, to have time to fulfill (even though by 
commission of an infringement) the tax obligation, possibly appointing another 
tax advisor17.
Finally, it is also worth recalling, in respect of the conduct of the tax advisor, 
the provisions of art. 10 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997 on the “mediated 
offender” (autore mediato), based on which if an advisor misleads a blameless 
taxpayer, he will incur liability in his place. The most frequent case, considered 
also in case-law, occurs in the area of breaches concerning the obligation to 
submit tax returns. Here, the advisor usually takes on the assignment and then 
fulfils the tax obligations in full autonomy. However, the advisor could fail to 
perform his work even though, instead, he assured the taxable person that he 
would: the client, accordingly, assumes that the practitioner he entrusted with 
the task actually proceeded to submit his tax return electronically. It is important 
to notice though that the mediated offender is not automatically identified. In 
fact, it is not sufficient that the submission of the tax return – or the fulfilment of 
any other tax obligation – is transferred to an agent, however qualified, for the 
taxable person not to be subject to tax penalties, pursuant to art. 10 of Legislative 
Decree nº 472/1997. The appointment of an agent does not release, in fact, the 
taxpayer from his obligations to check the tax advisor’s work and, therefore, to 
verify that the latter has fulfilled properly his tax obligations18. The fact that the 
omission is the result of the sole conduct of the agent, responsible for the breach 
by gross negligence, as is certainly the case for the omission or late submission 
of tax returns, does not relieve, therefore, the taxpayer of responsibility for the 
infringement of the obligation to submit the tax return.
4 ThE COMMISSION OF ThE TAX OFFENCE By AN INDIVIDUAL IN ThE INTEREST OF A LEGAL 
PERSON
Without any intention of carrying out an exhaustive analysis of the 
problems concerning complicity, it is finally worth considering also the case 
where the tax offence is accomplished by a natural person in the interest of 
a legal person. In that case, the legislator, pursuant to art. 7 of Decree-Law 
nº 269 of September 30, 2003, converted, with amendments, into Law nº 326 
17 This is the case where the tax advisor realizes that some invoices (booked under costs) document nonexistent 
transactions. The advisor will have to promptly inform the client that he does not intend to fill in the tax return, 
that will also include entirely lawful costs, and not too close to the deadline by which the tax return must be 
lodged, since the dutiful abstension of the tax practitioner from fulfilling his work must not turn into a damage 
for the private client.
 The latter, in fact, deprived of the professional support at the very end of the deadline set out for filing the 
tax return, would risk – because there was not enough time – incurring in failure to submit the tax return, a 
wrongdoing that the taxpayer had reasonably no intention to commit. 
18 See Court of Cassation, Section Civil VI-T, order nº 11832, June 9, 2016, in the “fisconline” database; Court 
of Cassation, Section Civil V, sentence nº 27712, December 11, 2013, in the “De Jure” database; Court of 
Cassation, Section Civil V, order nº 12472, May 21, 2010, in the “fisconline” database. 
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of November 24, 2003, does not faithfully apply the principle of personal 
liability of the subject that physically commits the infringement, but lays down 
that administrative penalties, which result from the violations concerning tax 
obligations of companies or entities having legal personality, are solely charged 
to the legal person benefiting from the violation. This regulatory position, 
however, must not be interpreted by way as a derogation from the provisions of 
art. 2, para. 2, of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, pursuant to which the penalty 
is applicable to the individual that committed the breach or contributed to it, 
but rather it appears to be in line with them. In actual fact, the legal person acts 
– obviously – through its organs that are, in practice, individuals. The actions or 
omissions of the individual, when conducted in the performance (whether legal 
or illegal) of their functions as organs of the represented entity, are actions or 
omissions of the entity itself and not of the person. Essentially, there is identity 
between the action (or omission) of the organ of the body corporate and the 
person that engages in (or omits) such conduct.
Correctly, in this case therefore it is impossibile to invoke the principle 
according to which the physical offender (i.e. the natural person) must be 
punished, since the sanction would be inflicted on a person that legally – on 
account of the organic identification – has nothing to do with the commission 
of the offence, unlike the taxable person (i.e. the legal person) who, thanks to 
that action (or omission) of his organ, perpetrates the offence and benefits from 
that19. Accordingly, with respect to the case in question, it appears proper to 
arrive at the conclusion of the “sole” responsibility of the legal person, since 
we do not deem it appropriate to recall the provisions of art. 9, para. 1, of 
Legislative Decree nº 472/1997 on complicity. 
Undoubtedly, however, the current regulatory framework, laid down in 
art. 7 of Decree-Law nº 269/2003, determines an unwarranted and irrational 
inequality of treatment between similar cases20. In fact, in respect of tax offences 
committed by the representative in the interest of subjects having no legal 
personality, such as breach of VAT legislation by partnerships, the sanction 
is inflicted on the physical offender, since the above art. 7 is (unreasonably) 
19 Even though by arguing about art. 98 of Decree nº 602 of the President of the Republic of 29 September 
1973, which has been repealed, also DEL FEDERICO, Lorenzo, Le sanzioni amministrative nel diritto 
tributario, cit., 325, raises perplexities in respect of the double liability incurred by the entity and by the 
representative/administrator since, based on the organic theory, the entity operates through its organs, but he 
clearly points out that, whether he embraces the organic theory or not, the legislator, except the compliance 
with constitutional principles, is legitimized in any case to characterise a double liability for wrongdoing 
to be incurred by the entity and the representative (327). In any case the repealed art. 98 set out a legal 
construct different from complicity, but provided for the mere joint and several liability between the entity 
and the representative/administrator. Such legislation can be found today under art. 11 of Legislative Decree 
nº 472/1997.
20 This is emphasized by GALLO, Franco, L’impresa e la responsabilità per le sanzioni amministrative tributarie, 
in Rass. trib., 2005, 11 et seq., who adopts a critical approach with respect to the provisions of art. 7 of 
Decree-Law nº 269/2003; as can be found in CARDON, Andrea, Le nuove sanzioni amministrative tributarie, 
in Dir. prat. trib., 2005, I, 385.
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applicable only to legal persons21. Nor does analogy appear to rescue this 
illogical regulatory framework and to be able to govern in the same way the 
above mentioned similar cases, in consideration of the well-known difficulty 
to employ interpretation by analogy in the field of penalties. However, besides 
the provisions of the above mentioned art. 7, from a more general standpoint, 
the current rules governing penalties appear excessively targeted to prosecuting 
the physical offender more than the taxable person that benefited from the 
breach committed in his interest. Financial penalties applicable for tax offences 
are inflicted, in fact, following an infringement that (almost always) allows the 
beneficiary to obtain the reduction or cancellation of the tax debt22. Basically, 
the tax obligation is a financial obligation as well as the sanction, which is 
commensurate also with the economic size of the former. Therefore, if the 
wrongdoing allows the taxable person to save on taxes contra legem, and the 
legal system responds applying a penalty having the same financial nature of 
the unfulfilled obligation, then it appears proper that the sanction be mainly 
inflicted on the person that did not abide by the principle of taxpaying capacity 
more than on the physical offender who acted in favor of the subject obtaining 
the benefit. 
It is quite a different matter when, by contrast, the physical offender is 
the legal guardian of the natural person that is disqualified or incapacitated. The 
legal guardianship is, in fact, the form of legal protection provided for in the 
Civil Code that allows the recipient to be supported in carrying out every action. 
The legal guardian takes the place of the person under legal guardianship in 
all legal acts, also concerning the financial situation: thus, the legal guardian 
does not perform any act for himself, but as if he were the protected person. 
Following the approach set out by the legislator for legal persons, if the analogy 
were applicable, only the person under legal guardianship should incur liability. 
Because, however, the person under legal guardianship is such since he is not 
deemed to be in full possession of his faculties, he cannot be considered liable 
to any tax penalty pursuant to art. 4 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997. It ensues 
that, in such case, from the sanction standpoint it is the legal guardian that must 
fulfil the obligation, otherwise if one thought to sanction the beneficiary of the 
tax offence – being disqualified, in this case – the illegal conduct would not be 
21 Therefore, we can endorse the considerations by COMASCHI, Elena, Sanzioni amministrative fiscali: 
riflessione sulla lesione del principio di irretroattività in malam partem a danno della persona giuridica, 
in Dir. prat. trib., 2006, II, 365, according to whom, in enforcing the provisions of art. 7 of Decree-Law 
nº 269/2003, it is possible to identify two channels for ascribing liability for tax offences. In particular, for 
entities having no legal personality, the general rule of directly sanctioning the individual perpetrating the 
breach is still being applied. On the contrary, for entities having legal personality, the special provisions based 
on the opposite direct liability of the legal persons are applied. 
22 Naturally, the infringements of the so-called formal obligations are sanctioned as well, such as the failure to 
fill in the questionnaire sent to the taxpayer by tax authorities, but the penalties arising from it do not appear 
to take on particular importance in consideration of their irrelevant economic size.
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sanctionable, and thus actions or omissions contra legem would be legitimized 
just because they are performed within a regime of legal protection. 
With regard to any offence committed by a natural person in the 
interest of a legal person one should not disregard, finally, art. 11 of Legislative 
Decree nº 472/1997 entitled “persons liable to administrative penalties”23. In 
our opinion, the provision is improperly phrased since it should refer only to 
persons or entities that are obliged to pay the administrative penalty. In other 
words, it should not fulfil the function of indicating the person or entity to be 
charged with the infringement and that, therefore, who is subject to sanctions. 
The person or entity to be sanctioned can, in fact, already be identified pursuant 
to the above mentioned articles 2 and 9 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997. 
Art. 11 recalls the breach committed in the determination or payment of the tax 
by a person different from the taxable one, but that is so closely connected to 
him – i.e. the legal representative of a natural or legal person – that this gives 
rise to a joint and several obligation to pay the sanction debt of the perpetrator 
of the offence, not benefiting from the illegal conduct, and the taxable person. 
The involvement of both the perpetrator and the taxable person in the payment 
of the penalty should therefore just be aimed at providing a financial safeguard 
for the proper fulfilment of the financial obligation and should not affect the 
ascription criteria as provided for in articles 2 and 9 examined above. For the 
cases of legal representation or representation in a legal transaction, the tax 
penalty must only be inflicted on the taxable person, since he is the one who 
benefits from the wrongdoing: however, it should be garanteed to the latter 
the right to claim recourse from the agent that physically perpetrated the 
offence. Basically, the terms of art. 11 under examination should be reversed 
with respect to the current regulatory provisions. The rule, in fact, provides for 
considering the physical offender as the person on whom the penalty must be 
inflicted, then adding to it the joint and several obligation of the represented 
person. By contrast, in our view, in terms of financial sanctions, the proper 
type of involvement of the physical offender who, not being the taxable person, 
certainly does not obtain any economic benefit from the breach itself, should be 
joint and several, yet secondary (dipendente), as against the primary obligation 
of the taxable person. Thus, the legislator should revise the provisions of 
art. 11 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, following the route already marked 
out in the area of sole responsibility of legal persons for wrongdoings committed 
in their interest by natural persons, as provided for in art. 7 of Decree-Law 
nº 269/2003. Furthermore, today, there is in fact a discrepancy between 
art. 11, providing for the sanction to be inflicted upon the individual who is the 
physical offender, ascribing the joint and several liability, on a secondary basis 
23 See PIERRO, Maria, Il responsabile per la sanzione amministrativa tributaria: art. 11 D.Lgs. n. 472 del 1997, 
in Riv. dir. fin. sc. fin., I, 224 et seq.; D’AYALA VALVA, Francesco, Aspetti problematici dell’imputazione 
soggettiva della sanzione amministrativa tributaria, 2003, I, 220-233.
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(in via dipendente), to the legal person, and art. 7 of Decree-Law nº 269/2003. 
Arguably, however, art. 7, already mentioned above as the provision in force, 
following art. 11 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, should have implicitely 
repealed the provisions of art. 11 in respect of wrongdoings committed in the 
interest of collective subjects (companies or entities) having legal personality. 
Indeed, the implicit repeal is perhaps questioned by the recent intervention of 
the delegated legislator through art. 16 of Legislative Decree nº 158 of September 
24, 2015. In fact, the delegated legislator has intervened precisely on art. 11 of 
Legislative Decree nº 472/1997, but without affecting the principle of joint and 
several obligation between the natural person that commits the breach of the 
law and the entity benefiting from that breach, which has remained formally 
unchanged also after the introduction of the new provisions. As a consequence, 
the legitimate question is, if in the mens legis in 2003, with the introduction 
of art. 7 of Decree-Law nº 269/2003, there was a tacit repeal of the scope of 
art. 11 of Decree-Law nº 472/1997, with the aim of imposing sanctions 
exclusively on legal persons, but such repeal remained however implicit, why 
such repeal was not later made esplicit on the occasion of the recent partial 
revision of the system of tax penalties and, more specifically, of the provision 
of art.11?24. Such observations that, if agreed upon, raise serious doubts on 
the interpretation of the rules reviewed here, should encourage the legislator 
to clarify the scope of art. 11 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997. It would be 
advisable, in this regard, to remove, from art. 11, the function of rule for the 
subjective ascription of the sanction, to privilege its purpose of guarantee for 
the collection of the tax credits ensuing from the sanctions. In fact, art. 11 
should be applied as a provision about the collection of financial penalties and 
merely strengthen the possibility of cashing in tax credits due to sanctions. In 
fact, ascribing the sanction burden primarily to the physical offender appears 
to be open to question since, as pointed out, the actor does not benefit from 
the offence, whereas by modifying the legislation as we suggested, at any rate, 
the creditor of the financial penalty would be protected as well. It is in fact 
evident that providing for a joint and several bond between the representative 
and the person represented, the former – already entrusted with the necessary 
powers to pay the obligations of the person represented – will ensure that the 
latter properly complies with his obligation to pay the penalty so as to avoid an 
enforcement order by the tax penalty creditor. 
If the position outlined here is agreed upon, the issue of (apparent) overlap 
between art. 7 of Decree-Law nº 269/2003 and art. 11 of Legislative Decree 
24 The tacit repeal of art. 11 of Legislative Decree nº 472/1997 by means of art. 7 of Decree-Law nº 269/2003, 
in the section providing for the joint and several liability for the debt resulting from tax penalties between the 
representative and the represented entity, is supported by BATISTONI FERRARA, Franco, Art. 11 – Responsabili 
per la sanzione amministrativa, in Commentario breve alle leggi tributarie, cit., 755; COMASCHI, Elena, 
Sanzioni amministrative fiscali: riflessione sulla lesione del principio di irretroattività in malam partem a 
danno della persona giuridica, cit., 375.
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nº 472/1997 will be solved as well: the former determines the sanctionable 
persons, the latter sets forth which persons can be required to pay the penalties. 
However, the joint and several liability appears to be imperative, even if is 
improperly provided for in art. 11, as previously pointed out, since the figures of 
the main obligor, i.e. the perpetrator of the tax offence, and that of the secondary 
(dipendente) obligor, the beneficiary of the tax offence, should be reversed. The 
categories of persons having an obligation to pay the penalties must, in fact, be 
firmly maintained, in order to ensure to a greater extent that such obligation is 
complied with, regardless of the criteria guiding the subjective imposition of the 
sanction itself.
